Introduction
This paper examines the extent to which shareholder taxes affect dividends and share repurchases. Specifically, we study changes in the mix of dividends and share repurchases following the enactment of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (2003 . The 2003 Act reduced dividend tax rates from 38.6 percent to 15 percent and the capital gains tax rates (which apply to share repurchases) from 20 percent to 15 percent for individual investors. Because the dividend tax cut exceeded the capital gains tax cut, we predict a shift from repurchases to dividends following enactment of the 2003 Act. We also predict that, because the legislation only affected individual investors, the shift increased in the probability that the distributions would be taxed on individual tax returns.
Our prediction that managers substituted dividends for repurchases does not mean that we expect that total share repurchases declined. To the contrary, since capital gains tax rates fell, share repurchases should have risen. However, for firms with large individual ownership, we expect an even greater percentage increase in dividends (because the dividend tax rate reductions exceeded the capital gains tax rate reductions), resulting in dividends comprising a larger percentage of total payouts. That said, we could envision an alternative outcome. If firms are less responsive to a cut in the dividend tax rate (e.g., because dividends are stickier than repurchases) than to a cut in the capital gains tax rate (albeit a smaller reduction), then we could find that substitution flowed in the opposite direction-from dividends to repurchases.
While understanding the extent to which taxes affect corporate decisions (in this case, payouts) is central to accounting, finance, and economics, we know relatively little about the substitution of dividends and repurchases. The reason is that it is difficult to construct tests that can link taxes to an increase in dividends and a corresponding decrease in repurchases (or vice versa). Consequently, scholars observe payout patterns and attempt to attribute them to taxes.
For example, Bagwell and Shoven (1989) document an increase in repurchases in the 1980s, which they attribute to firms finally learning the tax advantages of repurchases vis a vis dividends. In other words, they infer substitution from an increase in repurchases. However, Fama and French (2001) show that most repurchases are undertaken by dividend issuers who do not reduce their dividends. They conclude that firms increase repurchases to provide additional distributions, rather than substitute for dividends. That said, Grullon and Michaely (2002) look at similar data and conclude that those repurchases are supplanting dividends and that taxes are driving the substitution. This lack of consensus arises partly because none of the studies can directly link changes in payouts to changes in taxes.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) seemed to provide an opportunity to link taxes and substitution. TRA86 reduced the dividend tax rate from 50 percent to 28 percent and increased the capital gains tax rate from 20 percent to 28 percent. Using the same logic as in this paper, researchers expected dividends to soar and repurchases to tumble. Yet, DeAngelo et al. (2000) , Jagannathan et al. (2000) , and others point out that, after TRA86, aggregate repurchases soared, while dividends languished; prima facie evidence that TRA86 did not lead to substitution. Grullon and Michaely (2002) , however, report tax-motivated substitution at the firm level. They study market responses to announcements of repurchase programs around TRA86, find lower returns after passage, (consistent with a decline in the tax advantages of repurchases), and conclude that substitution increased following the enactment of TRA86. Lie and Lie (1999) concur, reporting that managers were less likely to repurchase shares after TRA86.
A problem with studying TRA86 is that it overhauled almost every element of personal and business taxes and phased-in the changes over two years. Thus, it is very difficult to isolate the effects of dividend and capital gains taxes on payouts around TRA86.
In this paper, we study a tax bill with equally dramatic changes in tax rates, but without the confounding effects of other changes in the tax system. The scope of the 2003 Act was narrow. Its genesis was individual dividend tax reduction. Its primary amendment was individual capital gains tax relief. 1 The final bill did little more than reduce dividend and capital gains tax rates. Because of its narrow focus, the 2003 Act provides a stronger setting than TRA86 to isolate the effects of taxes on the substitution of dividends and repurchases. 1 For the legislative history, see Auerbach and Hassett (2006) . For background about the political forces surrounding the capital gains tax rate reduction, see Becker and Gellman, Washington Post, June 26, 2007. 2 Similarly, when President Bush first mentioned dividend tax relief, International Paper's CEO, John Dillon said that even if dividends were tax-exempt, it would "not change our behavior with respect to dividends." (McKinnon, Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2003) . Brown et al. (2007) counter that repurchases funded many of those dividend initiations.
They report a positive relation between insider holdings and increases in dividends from 2002 to
2003, but no relation between insider holdings and increases in total payouts (dividends plus repurchases). They interpret these results as evidence of substitution by dividend initiators.
Since dividends were rising in insider ownership but total payouts were not, they infer that repurchases must have been falling in executive ownership. Hence, they conclude "…that firms with executive ownership-induced dividend initiations in response to the 2003 tax cut often engaged in dividend substitution…" (p.22). shares owned by individuals, the more firms were both increasing dividends and compensating CEOs with dividend-protected restricted stock, which became more attractive following the cuts in dividend tax rates. However, contrary to substitution, they find no evidence that the correlation between the change in the percentage of payouts distributed as dividends and the change in non-dividend-protected stock option grants is increasing in individual ownership.
3 Brown et al. (2007) are careful to state that their inferences about substitution are limited to 2003 dividend initiators. That said, because their sample includes both initiators and non-initiating firms, it was unclear to us whether the findings reported in Table VI of their paper shed any light on the issue of substitution among noninitiators. Private conversations with the authors confirmed that their conclusions were limited to 2003 dividend initiators. In addition, to enable us to investigate the non-initiators in their study more closely, the authors kindly provided us with their data for which we were most appreciative. We replicated their results, and, consistent with the inferences in their paper and our conversations with them, we found that their results only hold for firms that initiated in 2003.
They had expected a negative correlation, consistent with firms with low individual ownership continuing to repurchase and compensate CEOs with non-dividend-protected CEO stock option. To summarize, we extend prior work in four directions. We expand our analysis: (a) to include firms other than dividend initiators, (b) to consider the tax incentives of all taxpayers, including those unaffected by the legislation (thus providing an important control group), (c) to examine changes in payouts for eight quarters after enactment, and (d) to better specify the event period.
We test for substitution by examining a sample of firms that either paid dividends or repurchased shares during the two years preceding enactment of the 2003 Act. We find that these firms increased both dividends and share repurchases during the two years following passage. We also find that dividends constituted a larger percentage of their payouts after enactment than they had before enactment. Most importantly, we find that this shift toward dividends was increasing in the proportion of the firm owned by individuals, particularly officers and managers. As a result, we can link the change in the mix of payouts to the tax rate changes of those shareholders affected by the legislation, i.e., individual investors. We find no evidence that non-individual investors affect the change in the distribution mix. Linking the change in the mix to individuals and not to other investors greatly mitigates the likelihood that the mix changed for non-tax reasons, i.e., omitted correlated variables. Finally, we find that substitution began in the second quarter following passage and accelerated over the next two years, consistent with firms needing time to adjust their dividend and repurchase policies.
We infer from these results that firms substituted dividends for repurchases after the enactment of the 2003 Act. These findings are consistent with boards of directors (of all firms, not just dividend initiators) considering the tax preferences of stockholders when setting dividend and share repurchase policies (albeit with a lag) and dividends qualifying as substitutes for at least some share repurchases. To our knowledge, this is the first study to consider the influence of all investor groups on substitution and to quantify how quickly firms adjusted their payouts in response to the new tax incentives.
It is important to note this paper does not attempt to tackle the longstanding puzzle of why firms pay dividends when they could distribute profits through share repurchases, which remain tax-advantaged, though less so, even after the legislation. 5 Rather, we: (a) accept the fact that some firms paid dividends before the 2003 Act (obviously for non-tax reasons), (b) assume that the mix of dividends and repurchases was optimal before passage of the legislation, (c) predict that firms will pay even more dividends after 2003, (d) test whether part of that increase was funded by a smaller increase in repurchases than would otherwise have occurred, and (e) find evidence consistent with substitution from repurchases to dividends.
The next section discusses the regression model. Section 3 details the sample selection.
Section 4 presents the findings. Closing remarks follow.
Regression Model
As discussed above, we test the correlation between the individual ownership of the firm and the percentage of total payouts (dividends plus repurchases) that are dividends. We predict that dividends as a percentage of payouts increased with the firm's individual ownership following passage of the 2003 Act. This section details the research design that we employ.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable (DIV%) is a ratio. We can measure repurchases in two ways. One option is total share repurchases.
Another option is net repurchases, i.e., total share repurchases less stock issuances. 7 We use net repurchases because we are interested in the cash that the firm could have distributed as dividends (i.e., the discretionary repurchases). Fama and French (2001) 13-F filings crudely measure individual ownership. Ideally, we would measure the number of shares for which the dividends and capital gains are expected to flow through to individual tax returns, i.e., those shares held by individuals or flow-through entities (e.g., mutual funds, partnerships, trusts, S corporations, or limited liability corporations) whose income is reported on U.S. individual tax returns. This ideal measure would exclude all other holdings, i.e., those shares for which the dividends and capital gains do not flow through to individual tax returns, such as tax-exempt organizations, corporations, foreigners, and tax-deferred accounts (e.g., qualified retirement plans, including pensions, 401(k), and IRAs). Unfortunately, the ideal measure does not exist. Thus, we cannot observe whether personal taxes affect the returns from the investments.
To try to address this measurement problem, we include a third measure of ownership, MF, which is the percentage of the firm owned by mutual funds, as reported in 13-F filings and collected by Thomson Financial's Institutional Holdings database. Mutual funds include both investments that are subject to personal taxes and investments that are not subject to personal the security. On a different note, conclusions do not change if we limit INSIDER to direct holdings, excluding shares held by family members, trusts and corporations controlled by the insider, and similar related parties. MF are intended to capture all individual holdings, we do not expect the coefficient on POST to be positive. A positive coefficient on POST will raise doubts about whether the change in the mix after enactment was related to the tax rate reductions for individual investors.
Control variables
Theory is not sufficiently rich to provide much guidance concerning the control variables in a regression where the dependent variable is the mix of dividends and repurchases. To our knowledge, no paper models the non-tax variables that should vary with the percentage of payouts that are dividends. Thus, we take the approach of including various measures that are known to affect dividends or repurchases. As detailed below, we find that the inferences from our tests are largely insensitive to the control variables, which suggests that our results are not dependent on our ad hoc specification of control variables.
First, we include lagged retained earnings scaled by lagged total assets (RE) in the model. A firm must have earnings and profits (as defined in the tax law) for its distributions to be taxed as dividends. Since earnings and profits are only found in confidential corporate tax returns and thus unobservable, we use retained earnings as a proxy for earnings and profits. If firms with low or no retained earnings have fewer distributions that qualify as dividends, then DIV% should increase in RE. Consistent with this expectation and liquidity constraints, DeAngelo et al. (2005) report that firms with low or no retained earnings pay fewer dividends.
Next, we include earnings in the model. Jagannathan et al. (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) report that dividends are paid from permanent earnings, whereas, repurchases are paid from transitory earnings. Dittmar and Dittmar (2004) contend that both are paid from permanent earnings, but agree that repurchases come from transitory earnings. Thus, we dichotomize earnings into a permanent part (PERM) and a transitory part (TRANS). We measure PERM with operating income and TRANS as the difference between net income and operating income. We scale both components by lagged assets. Based on the conflicts in the prior work, we make no prediction about the sign of PERM. However, we expect DIV% should decrease in TRANS.
We also include a measure of the firm's payout capacity, free cash flow, scaled by lagged assets (FCF). Dividends may be a mechanism to reduce agency problems in firms with free cash flow (Jenson and Meckling, 1986) . Thus, we anticipate that DIV% is increasing in FCF. We include the lagged ratio of dividends to the market value of equity (DYIELD), expecting DIV% to be increasing in the DYIELD. We add lagged long-term debt, scaled by lagged assets, (LEVERAGE) to control for cross-firm variation in capital structure. Finally, we include the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) to control for any size effects. We have no expectations about the sign of the LEVERAGE and SIZE coefficients.
Sample Selection
To share repurchases before and after enactment. The 534 firms that paid dividends at least once before and at least once after enactment are "consistent payers." The 850 firms that repurchased shares at least once before and at least once after enactment are "consistent repurchasers." Cell (a) in Table 1 shows that there are 309 firms that are both consistent payers and consistent repurchasers. That is, they both paid dividends and repurchased stock at least once during the eight quarters preceding passage of the bill and at least once during the eight quarters following passage.
Working through Table 1 , we see that 163 firms did not pay dividends before enactment, but did pay dividends after enactment ("initiating payers"), 29 firms paid dividends before enactment, but did not pay dividends after enactment ("omitting payers"), and 1,503 firms neither paid dividends during the eight quarters before passage nor paid dividends during the eight quarters after passage. Likewise, 256 firms initiated repurchases after enactment; 408 repurchased before but not after passage; and 715 firms never repurchased shares.
Focusing on the firms that were either paying dividends or repurchasing shares during the eight quarters preceding passage of the 2003 Act, we construct five samples to use in our tests:
a. unbalanced panel of 1,639 firms with at least one distribution over the 16 quarters Besides detailing the sample selection, Table 1 provides some initial evidence consistent with firms shifting from repurchases to dividends. We find that 28 firms both initiated dividends and ceased repurchasing (cell g) after passage of the 2003 Act, while only two firms omitted dividends and began repurchasing (cell j). We also find that, among consistent repurchasers, 99
firms initiated dividends (cell e) while only nine firms omitted dividends (cell i), a net increase in dividend issuers of 90 firms. Conversely, among consistent dividend payers, 55 companies began repurchasing after passage (cell b), but 77 stopped buying back shares (cell c), a net decrease in repurchasers of 22 firms. Expanding this comparison to all firms, we find that 163 companies initiated dividends while only 29 firms omitted dividends (a net increase of 134 dividend issuers). Meanwhile, 256 firms began repurchasing after enactment while 408 companies stopped repurchasing (a net reduction of 152 repurchasers). All of these comparisons are consistent with a shift from repurchases to dividends following enactment of the 2003 Act. We predict that the coefficients on INSIDER*POST and NONEXEC*POST will be positive, indicative of firms responding to the changed tax incentives for insiders and nonexecutives, respectively. To the extent MF captures the mutual fund investments whose dividends and capital gains are taxed on individual returns, we expect the coefficients on MF*POST will be positive. Finally, we predict that the sign on POST will not be positive. The We regress DIV% on the shareholder groups and their interactions with POST. As Column D uses the same sample and regression model as Column C, but adds industry categorical variables (which are not tabulated). The inclusion of the industry dummies has no qualitative effect on the variables of interest. This regression model is the primary one that we use in subsequent tests detailed below.
Descriptive statistics

Results
Primary findings
Moving across Table 3 , Column E employs the same regression model as Column D;
however, it uses the sample of 545 firms that paid dividends at least once before enactment This decline in magnitude and significance is not surprising for at least two reasons.
First, firms must pay repurchases for there to be substitution from repurchases to dividends and some of these firms only paid dividends. Second, dividend-paying firms likely had less capacity for dividend increases than non-dividend paying firms. Consistent with these explanations, the findings suggest that the shift from repurchases to dividends primarily occurred among those firms that were distributing less in dividends and more in repurchases before enactment.
Nonetheless, we still detect evidence of substitution (a positive INSIDER*POST coefficient) among this set of pre-enactment dividend issuers.
Column F provides further evidence that pre-enactment repurchasers engaged in more substitution than the pre-enactment dividend issurers. Examining the sample of 955 firms that repurchased shares at least once in the eight quarters preceding passage (Repurchasers), we find the largest coefficients in Table 3 for both INSIDER*POST (1.01) and NONEXEC*POST (0.48).
Both coefficients are highly significant. We infer from Columns E and F that the shift from repurchases to dividends was mostly among firms that had been repurchasing shares.
The last three columns (G, H, and I) look at the D&R sample, i.e., the 395 firms that both paid dividends and repurchased shares before enactment of the 2003 Act. Since these 395 firms had distributed profits through both dividends and repurchases before enactment, their marginal costs of substitution may have been less than those of other firms, assuming they still had dividend capacity. The reason is that these firms would not face start-up costs associated with initiating dividends and repurchasing shares, such as signals to the market. Thus, they may have been able to respond to their shareholders' tax preferences without incurring as many costs as other firms would have.
Column G employs the same regression model, as in Columns D, E, and F. Results are similar. As would be expected, the coefficients on INSIDER*POST (0.42) and NONEXEC*POST (0.24) are between those for dividend payers in Column E and repurchasers in Column F. Both are significant.
Column H repeats the same regression using ordinary least squares. The coefficient on INSIDER*POST remains significantly greater than zero. The NONEXEC*POST coefficient is positive, but not significant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.07). We infer from these results that use of the logit regression model has little impact on our inferences.
Column I adds firm fixed effects to the logit regression model in Column G. The coefficients become slightly smaller. The coefficients on INSIDER*POST (0.31) and NONEXEC*POST (0.16) remain significantly greater than zero. One new development is that the MF*POST coefficient (0.23), which is insignificant in all of the other specifications, is statistically greater than zero at the 5 percent level when we employ firm fixed effects.
The theme throughout Table 3 is that the dividend/repurchase mix shifted after the 2003
Act in a manner consistent with the changed tax incentives of officers, directors, and, to a lesser extent, other individual investors. The failure (except in Column I) to detect any influence from mutual funds is consistent with the managers of mutual firms ignoring the tax considerations of their individual investors. At the same time, it is possible that our test is too weak to detect the influence of individual investors in mutual funds because we cannot observe the extent to which individuals hold the shares in the funds. We also find no evidence that non-individual investors affected substitution (the POST coefficient is never significantly greater than zero), an important finding for establishing that the shift was tax-motivated.
Comparisons with other years
As a robustness check, we repeat the tests in this study for other years, when tax rates were not reduced. Finding similar relations between DIV% and the individual ownership variables in years without rate reductions will raise questions about the inferences drawn above.
Using the same sample selection process, variables, and regression model as employed in Table 3 , Column D, we repeat the analysis for every year from 1994 to 2001. 13 Table 4 The findings in Table 4 provide comfort about the inferences that we drew from Table 3 reports summary statistics from tests that aggregate dividends and repurchases over the eight quarters before enactment and the eight quarters after enactment, creating two observations (pre and post) for each firm. The results reported in Table 5 For the quarterly analysis, we use the same samples to estimate the same nine regressions as those reported in Table 3 . The inferences that we draw from Table 5 are qualitatively the same as those from Table 3 . The coefficient on INSIDER*POST is always positive and significant. The coefficient of NONEXEC*POST is always positive and is significant in six of the nine regressions. The MF*POST coefficient is positive in seven of the nine regressions, but is never significant. The POST coefficient is never significantly greater than zero. In short, as would be expected, when we treat each quarter as a separate observation, we reach the same inferences as we do when we aggregate the pre and post quarters.
Speed of payout adjustments
More importantly, a quarterly analysis enables us to look at the coefficients for each quarter separately and study the pace of substitution. Using the balanced sample in Consistent with the findings throughout the paper, we see no trend for the MF coefficients, providing further evidence that mutual fund investors were not influencing substitution from repurchases to dividends. We also find no pattern among the NOTIND coefficients, as predicted. This provides further support for tax-induced substitution, since the non-individual investors were unaffected by the tax rate reductions and, thus, should not have influenced substitution.
Closing remarks
This paper tests for changes in dividend and repurchase policies following the 2003 reductions in dividend and capital gains tax rates. We hypothesize that firms increased dividends at the expense of share repurchases because the reduction in dividend tax rates exceeded the reduction in capital gains tax rates. Because individuals were the only investors who benefited from the tax rate reductions, we predict that substitution increased in the percentage of shares held by individuals.
We find evidence consistent with dividends crowding out repurchases. Our findings suggest that managers and officers consider the tax preferences of stockholders (particularly themselves) when setting dividend and share repurchase policies and also provide evidence that dividends can serve as substitutes for at least some share repurchases. As predicted, we find no evidence that firms are responsive to non-individual investors.
Previous studies struggled to produce compelling evidence of substitution because their settings did not provide a clear link between taxes, changes in dividends, and corresponding changes in repurchases. In contrast, the 2003 Act provided a clean setting in which substitution could be established by documenting that the shift from repurchases to dividends was increasing in the percentage of the firm held by individuals. Nonetheless, prior work had failed to reach a consensus about whether firms substituted dividends for repurchases following the 2003 Act. By broadening the analysis to investigate more firms (namely, non-dividend initiators), shareholders (including mutual funds and non-individuals), and time (eight quarters following enactment), we construct a more powerful test of substitution which enables us to link changes in shareholder tax rates to changes to the distribution mix.
Besides its scholarly contribution, understanding the impact of the 2003 Act on payouts has implications for ongoing discussions about future reductions in shareholder taxes. 14 In 2003, President Bush and Republican Congressional leaders advocated slashing the shareholder tax rates because it would dislodge profits that firms were suboptimally (from a non-tax perspective) retaining as cash. They argued that by reducing the cost of distributing earnings, funds would flow to firms with better investment opportunities.
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While estimating the efficiency gains from the legislation is beyond the scope of this paper, the results in this paper do suggest that some firms (particularly those with disproportionate insider ownership) responded to the rate reductions by reallocating their distributions from repurchases to dividends. In other words, rather than increasing their total payout, they merely shifted from one distribution method to another. Consequently, their dividend increases overstate their aggregate increase in payouts because they funded some of their dividend increases with reductions in their share repurchases. Thus, to the extent substitution occurred, aggregate distributions were unchanged.
These findings raise at least two questions for future research. First, the fact that substitution was most dramatic for firms with high manager and officer ownership implies that insiders were considering their own personal tax considerations when setting distribution policy.
Non-executive individual investors at those firms benefited because their tax personal incentives were aligned with the those of the individuals running the company. Conversely, non-individual investors in those firms were disadvantaged because insiders were responding to changes in personal tax law that did not affect the non-individuals. This raises questions about the downside Firms that paid dividends at least once before and once after enactment are "consistent payers." Firms that repurchased shares at least once before and once after enactment are "consistent repurchasers." Initiating payers (initiating repurchasers) paid no dividends (repurchased no shares) in the eight quarters before enactment, but did pay dividends (repurchase shares) at least once in the eight quarters following passage. Omitting payers (Omitting repurchasers) paid dividends (repurchased shares) in the eight quarters before enactment, but did not pay dividends (repurchase shares) at least once in the eight quarters following passage. Composition of the "All Obs" sample:
DIVIDEND PAYERS
REPURCHASERS
Firms meeting original criteria 2,229 Less: Firms with neither dividends nor repurchases before or after enactment 590 All observations with at least one dividend or one repurchase 1,639
Composition of the "All Firms" sample:
Firms meeting original criteria 2,229 Less: Firms with neither dividends nor repurchases:
Before enactment (f, h, n) (219) After enactment (k, l, o) (315) Before or after enactment (p) (590) (1,124) All firms with at least one distribution before and after enactment 1,105
Composition of the "Dividend Payers" sample:
All firms with at least one distribution before and after enactment (above) 1,105 Less: Firms never paying dividends (m) (433) Firms not paying dividends before enactment (e, g) (127) (560) Firms paying dividends before enactment 545
Composition of the "Repurchasers" sample:
All firms with at least one distribution before and after enactment ( lagged retained earnings scaled by lagged assets (data58/data44). PERM is operating income (data21 -data5 -data22) scaled by lagged assets (data44). TRANS is net income scaled by lagged assets (data69/data44) less PERM. FCF is defined as income before extraordinary items (data 8) plus interest expense (data 22) less the change in the applicable balance sheet accounts: (assets (data44), liabilities (data54), debt (data45, data51)) scaled by lagged assets (data44). DYIELD is the lagged ratio of dividends per share to price, expressed in percentages (data16/data14). LEVERAGE is lagged long-term debt (data51 + data 45) scaled by lagged assets (data44). SIZE is the natural log of assets (data44). (data58/data44) . PERM is operating income (data21 -data5 -data22) scaled by lagged assets (data44). TRANS is net income scaled by lagged assets (data69/data44) less PERM. FCF is defined as income before extraordinary items (data 8) plus interest expense (data 22) less the change in the applicable balance sheet accounts: (assets (data44), liabilities (data54), debt (data45, data51)) scaled by lagged assets (data44). DYIELD is the lagged ratio of dividends per share to price, expressed in percentages (data16/data14). LEVERAGE is lagged long-term debt (data51 + data 45) scaled by lagged assets (data44). SIZE is the natural log of assets (data44). RE is lagged retained earnings scaled by lagged assets (data58/data44). PERM is operating income (data21 -data5 -data22) scaled by lagged assets (data44). TRANS is net income scaled by lagged assets (data69/data44) less PERM. FCF is defined as income before extraordinary items (data 8) plus interest expense (data 22) less the change in the applicable balance sheet accounts: (assets (data44), liabilities (data54), debt (data45, data51)) scaled by lagged assets (data44). DYIELD is the lagged ratio of dividends per share to price, expressed in percentages (data16/data14). LEVERAGE is lagged long-term debt (data51 + data 45) scaled by lagged assets (data44). SIZE is the natural log of assets (data44). of the firm owned by mutual funds as reported in 13-F filings and collected by Thomson Financial's Institutional Holdings database. RE is lagged retained earnings scaled by lagged assets (data58/data44). PERM is operating income (data21 -data5 -data22) scaled by lagged assets (data44). TRANS is net income scaled by lagged assets (data69/data44) less PERM. FCF is defined as income before extraordinary items (data 8) plus interest expense (data 22) less the change in the applicable balance sheet accounts: (assets (data44), liabilities (data54), debt (data45, data51)) scaled by lagged assets (data44). DYIELD is the lagged ratio of dividends per share to price, expressed in percentages (data16/data14). LEVERAGE is lagged long-term debt (data51 + data 45) scaled by lagged assets (data44). SIZE is the natural log of assets (data44). lagged retained earnings scaled by lagged assets (data58/data44). PERM is operating income (data21 -data5 -data22) scaled by lagged assets (data44). TRANS is net income scaled by lagged assets (data69/data44) less PERM. FCF is defined as income before extraordinary items (data 8) plus interest expense (data 22) less the change in the applicable balance sheet accounts: (assets (data44), liabilities (data54), debt (data45, data51)) scaled by lagged assets (data44). DYIELD is the lagged ratio of dividends per share to price, expressed in percentages (data16/data14). LEVERAGE is lagged long-term debt (data51 + data 45) scaled by lagged assets (data44). SIZE is the natural log of assets (data44). (Table 3 n/a n/a n/a n/a +1 0. 
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